While I've noted (in VICTORY POINT and associated web sites) the existence of substantial factual errors and omissions in general reporting of Operation Red Wings, I've not specifically addressed where these inaccuracies originated. Why not, and why now? Why not: My project with VICTORY POINT was to tell the story of two Marine Corps Operations, Red Wings and Whalers, and while noting that there were substantial errors in existing media accounts of Red Wings (I pointed this out in the introductory matter in the book), I saw no need to take the space to identify from where these inaccuracies came. I just told the story, and adhered to cross-referenced, vetted facts, avoiding exaggeration, omission, and fabrication. In the spring of 2010, a year after the hardcover release of VICTORY POINT, I decided to specifically address individual points of inaccuracy and omission in www.darack.com/sawtalosar (and associated web sites) as part of a "primer" for those who had not yet read VICTORY POINT. So, why now? Because ever more is being written about Red Wings, and what is being written, at least in part, continues to stray from what actually occurred.

Before I get into the details, I want to pass along a paraphrased quote that a number of U.S. Marine Corps commanders (mostly senior field grade and general grade, but some junior field grade and company grade--as well as a large number of enlisted, of all ranks and billets) have stated to me during media embed projects with their unit(s): first and foremost, U.S. Marines strive to be exceptional citizens of the United States, and to hold above all else in importance fidelity to the nation's citizenry, and in that they want the full story of what they do to always be told to the public, be that story good, bad, or somewhere in between--meaning that they want it told without exaggeration, omission, or fabrication. Marines want their story told accurately.

Marines profess to want to be held absolutely accountable. They like to say that "America has a Marine Corps not because America needs a Marine Corps, but because America wants a Marine Corps." Marines state that they feel that it is their duty, both as individuals and as a group, to constantly prove themselves to the citizens of the United States. And after years of embedding with them, throughout the globe, in combat zones and back stateside during training, I can state that almost without exception, they live up to this standard; I believe that they mean it.

A a quick side note to the above: Probably the best succinct overview of the United States Marine Corps ethos, for those interested, is the article by Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC entitled "Understanding the Few Good Men: An Analysis of Marine Corps Service Culture," available with the authors' permission here, in .pdf format. Read it and pass it along.

Having conducted the interviews and compiled the vast amount of information necessary to write VICTORY POINT(not a single fact or statement of which has been disputed, to date), and having carefully reviewed what has been released (by the military as well as private sector publishers - much of which has been approved for public dissemination by entities of United States Special Operations Command), I've not only realized that the historical record (the "historical record" being the aggregate of magazine, newspaper, and online articles, television and radio broadcasts, and books) for Red Wings is addled with incompetent research, but I am of the opinion that this historical record is polluted with intentionally misleading accounts.

I'm not going to rehash what I wrote in www.darack.com/sawtalosar (including the specific elements of misinformation such as enemy numbers during the SEAL ambush, Ahmad Shah's status in the world of global terrorists, etc.), but instead provide a narrative, arranged sequentially, of my involvement with this project, and provide you with my insight on the exaggerations, omissions, and distortions as I discovered them.

As I noted at the bottom of the page at www.darack.com/sawtalosar, I first met 2/3 at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) near Bridgeport, California, in the late winter of 2005. I traveled to the MWTC to do an article about the little-known but important base for Gannett Newspapers. At that time I was also beginning a feature article for Smithsonian Air and Space on Close Air Support. While at Bridgeport, I was introduced to the commanding officer of TTECG (Tactical Training Exercise Control Group), who happened to be visiting (TTECG is part of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) at the Marine Corps base at 29 Palms, California; the Mountain Warfare Training Center falls under the command of MCAGCC). I was invited to go to live fire training at MCAGCC after my visit to the MWTC to learn about close air support first hand. I spent a week at MCAGCC observing live combined arms training, including live close air support training. I subsequently embedded with Marines at the MWTC for their Mountain Leader Course throughout a good portion of the summer of 2005. So by the time I traveled to Afghanistan, I'd had a fairly good introduction to various aspects of the Marine Corps, most of it very relevant to current operations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many of those with whom I was embedded had recently returned from Afghanistan. So by the time I arrived on the ground in Afghanistan's Kunar Province, I felt I'd had at least a decent base of knowledge--but still a lot to learn.

When I arrived at Camp Blessing early one morning (around 3 in the morning) in the back of a Humvee late in September of 2005, I really didn't know what to expect of the embed on which I was embarking. It turned out to be an incredible learning experience. Not only because I was able to interview Marines and others who had taken part in Red Wings, but because I was able to walk the area of operation myself--including participating in a number of combat operations, side-by-side with the Marines of Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, as well as members of other units.

At this point, little had been written about Red Wings. Most of the coverage was limited to the fact that nineteen United States Special Operations personnel died in the disaster of 28 JUNE 2005. The location was never noted (Sawtalo Sar mountain), nor was the background of the operation ever discussed, nor was Marine Corps involvement mentioned. The story was unbelievably incomplete.

While with the Marines and attached personnel (inclusive of those of other services, local fighters, and interpreters), all of whom were at least somewhat familiar with Red Wings (with most very familiar, as they had taken part in the op), I learned a great deal about the operation--the entire operation, inclusive of the overall planning, the objective, troop allocations, where the ambush of the SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team took place, who (and how many) ambushed the SEALs, and about the search and recovery effort of Red Wings II. The on-the-ground tactical details I learned from those at Camp Blessing would be supplemented by the "larger picture" planning details of the battalion's senior leadership, both while I was in Afghanistan and afterwards. I also learned about the only surviving member of the four man SEAL reconnaissance and surveillance team, Marcus Luttrell. While I was given specific key details about the story of Luttrell's survival (many of the Marines I'd accompanied during combat operations as well as during time spent at Camp Blessing had read Luttrell's after action report, and I was able to individually interview them, to ensure accuracy), my intent was not to focus on the SEAL ambush, subsequent shootdown of the MH-47, or the Luttrell evasion and then rescue, but on the entire story, which I learned began with 3/3 and continued through to the successful Operation Whalers and hence free elections in September, 2005. Unlike had been portrayed in news media, the SEAL disaster was but one part of a much larger story.

After one month of on-the-ground research, I returned to BAF (Bagram Air Field), the headquarters of CJTF-76 (Combined Joint Task Force 76). I was originally allotted 10 days to stay with the Marines of 2/3. I exceeded my stay by almost three weeks. I had passed a request to public affairs at CJTF-76 to interview MajGen Kamiya, the commanding general of CJTF-76, as well as others, including members of CJSOTF-A (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan) about Red Wings. When the Blackhawk on which I flew to BAF landed, I was immediately escorted to the main gate, no explanation given, and left to get back to Kabul. I was never granted any of the interviews I'd requested.

After returning from Afghanistan in late October 2005, I began compiling my research on Red Wings, and began to assemble what I had on Whalers. At this stage, I had a large amount of research on Red Wings, and just a small amount on Whalers. During this time I reached out to members of Naval Special Warfare, making individual contact attempts as well as formal requests through their branch of public affairs. I was successful in gleaning information about certain SEAL tactics, but was completely unsuccessful at getting anywhere through formal channels. I realized that since I had key points of Marcus Luttrell's after action report, I really didn't need to interview him, but I nevertheless wanted to discuss if he had other information that readers of a book on the subject of Red Wings and Whalers might find interesting. I requested to interview Marcus Luttrell through formal channels but was immediately denied each time. While I understood that members of Naval Special Warfare were to be kept (for the most part) off limits from media types, I thought that my background of having spent time in the area of operation of Red Wings, as well as my experience with the Marines who had taken part in the op, would have allowed me to get some additional access. As well, this was a timely subject, and due to the nature and magnitude of the disaster (the greatest single day loss of special operations life since the formation of U.S. Special Operations Command and the greatest loss of life for Naval Special Warfare since World War II), I thought it appropriate for Naval Special Warfare public affairs to provide at least some additional pieces of information to those in media expressing interest. My sense, and this is only "my sense" during my brief phone conversations with members of NSW public affairs was that they were assuming a decidedly defensive, protective posture--particularly after I mentioned Luttrell's name (which hadn't been formally released at that time). I did not mention, however, that I had access to key points of his after action report. At this point, nothing contained in the after action had been publicly released.

Just some interesting side notes: In my research, I found that Luttrell's name was mistakenly released by the Navy as one of those killed in the helicopter downing. His name should have remained unreleased altogether (I was passed it through a source), but it did appear erroneously here (2 JULY 2005 issue of the Honolulu Advertiser) where he was listed as one of six (at that time identified out of sixteen) killed in the MH-47 crash. The only other public references to Luttrell I found were on a web site for a martial arts dojo in Spring, Texas (a photo with a caption identifying him) and a caption of a photo in a book on SEAL class 228. This was all interesting research, but again, as it was just a part of the much larger picture of the overall campaign, I realized that I should focus my attention on explaining the (many) other aspects of the operation itself, as well as Whalers; I already had Luttrell's story.

During this time I revisited both MWTC as well as MCAGCC (29 Palms). While at 29 Palms, during a live fire event where I was positioned at "OP Left" (which overlooks the Quackenbush Impact Area), I met (then) Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Cooling and Sergeant Major William T. Stables, respectively the commanding officer and sergeant major of the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3). As discussed at length in www.darack.com/sawtalosar, 3/3 had immediately preceded 2/3 in country in Afghanistan, and had developed not only the operational model after which Red Wings was based, but the shell of the op (what they called Stars) that would become Red Wings. At that time (November 2005), 3/3 was undertaking their predeployment workup training for their upcoming deployment to the Anbar Province of Iraq (after returning from Afghanistan, 2/3 would replace 3/3, in Iraq). The three of us didn't have much time to discuss Red Wings, but agreed to take time at a future date to go into 3/3's deployment at length. Colonel Cooling and other staff members of 3/3 would become an absolutely invaluable source of information for me in telling the complete story of Red Wings and Whalers.

In early january, 2006, I put up the first "announcement" that I was going to write a book. At the time I tentatively titled the planned book "Sawtalo Sar: The Untold Story of Operations Red Wings and Whalers" - "Sawtalo Sar" being the name of the mountain around which both Red Wings and Whalers took place. I created www.darack.com/sawtalosar. The archived version of the site is here. The site included facts never before published, including the location of Red Wings, the correct name, and the naming convention, the Marine Corps' involvement in Red Wings, etc.

I was reunited with the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment in the winter of 2006 in Hawaii. The battalion had just returned from their deployment to Afghanistan. I was able to re-interview those I'd already interviewed in Afghanistan, as well, I was able to go into detail with Marines and commanders, inclusive of the battalion commander (LtCol James Donnellan), the battalion executive officer (Major Robert R. Scott), the battalion Operations Officer (Major Thomas D. Wood), and the battalion intelligence officer (Major Scott Westerfield). As well, I was able to speak at greater length with LtCol Cooling about his perspective as 3/3's commanding officer.

Additionally, I interviewed commanders and Marines of units I was not embedded with during my time in Afghanistan, but who played key roles in both Red Wings and Whalers. These included Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis (the commanding officer of 2/3 for the first 30 days of their deployment, who took part in the planning of Red Wings and was on-scene for the recovery on Sawtalo Sar), Captain Kelly Grissom (key role in Whalers), Capt. Casmer "Pigeon" Ratkowiak (Red Wings and Whalers), Captain Peter Capuzzi (Red Wings), 1st Lieutenant James J. ("JJ") Konstant ("Konnie") (Whalers), and many others. By the end of my time in Hawaii, I had most of what I needed on Red Wings, and a good portion of what I needed for Whalers. I began laying out the actual book that would become VICTORY POINT.

I once again met up with 2/3 in July, at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at 29 Palms, California for their predeployment training for their forthcoming deployment to the Anbar Province of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF), where their sister battalion, 3/3, was serving at that time. In addition to working on a new project about Iraq, I was able to recheck facts and timelines, etc. for the book. I would continue with this and other projects through the coming months.

In October of 2006 I traveled once again to the Mountain Warfare Training Center where I gave a PME (Professional Military Education discussion) to officers and SNCOs (staff non-commissioned officers) at the base on Operation Red Wings. It was great to be able to present this information, as I was able to provide to those unfamiliar with the specifics of the op a fairly full spectrum view of its development and execution, but more importantly (for the book), the audience was able to provide feedback and analysis to me. While VICTORY POINT was not an "analysis" book, but rather, a "tell it like it really happened" book, I would seek objective analysis throughout the development of the project.

Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis (the commanding officer of 2/3 for the first 30 days of the battalion's Afghan deployment) and Major Robert R. Scott (the executive officer of the battalion for 2/3's full Afghan deployment), this article was the first to properly identify the overall structure of Red Wings as well as the first to properly identify the op by its correct name (Red Wings vice Redwing). This is an excellent article, written by two Marine officers with intimate knowledge of Red Wings who played integral roles in the development of the operation and who were on the ground on Sawtalo Sar for the recovery effort. The article can be found in the archives of the Marine Corps Gazette, NOVEMBER 2006 Issue.

While not directly tied to VICTORY POINT, I did speak with a number of Marines about Red Wings and Whalers who added valuable first person accounts for the book while I embedded with units on combat operations during this time.

In early June of 2007, the Washington Post published this article. In the same week, the book Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10 was released. Marcus Luttrell was listed as the author, with Patrick Robinson listed as a contributor. I read the article in the Washington Post with great interest, and was stunned by the omission of Marine Corps involvement, the misstatement of the name of the operation, the exaggerated enemy numbers, the outright fabrication that "U.S. intelligence officials believed [Ahmad] Shah was close to Osama bin Laden," and among other items, the account that Lieutenant Michael Murphy, the leader of the four man Naval Special Operations reconnaissance and surveillance team of which Luttrell was a member, put up to vote whether to kill unarmed civilians who soft compromised them. No "vote" was ever mentioned in Luttrell's after action report.

I immediately ordered Lone Survivor, thinking that the book would provide much more detail than the Post article did. I also contacted all of the members of 2/3 who played roles in Red Wings, asking them if they'd been contacted about providing after action reports or interviews for Lone Survivor. None had. I read the book, thinking that I could possibly use information in it as source material for VICTORY POINT. Information in Lone Survivor, however strayed so substantially from Luttrell's after action report, and so much general information in it was so inaccurate that I could not use it as a source. For instance, the book describes "hundreds" of Taliban, when in Luttrell's after action report, he stated 20 to 35. While analysis of intelligence later revealed a number somewhere in the range of 8 to 10, the Navy used a number more in line with Luttrell's original after action on the official Medal of Honor citation for Lieutenant Murphy: "BETWEEN 30 AND 40 ENEMY FIGHTERS...."

A few weeks after its release, I learned that Lone Survivor was written in its entirety by Patrick Robinson (a British writer who primarily pens military fiction titles, many of which portray U.S. Navy SEALs), based on unrecorded interviews of Marcus Luttrell by Robinson. The writing was done while Luttrell was subsequently deployed to Iraq. I also read in this article, written by Patrick Robinson himself, that Naval Special Warfare chose him to be the ghost writer, and this choice had been made just weeks after Operation Red Wings had drawn to a close. The choice by Naval Special Warfare to select Robinson to ghost write Lone Survivor was made, according to Robinson, because Naval Special Warfare felt that Robinson had demonstrated a thorough understanding of SEALs through his fiction books. Robinson and Luttrell then secured a book deal and a movie deal. The book was released within just days of Luttrell retiring from the Navy. Lone Survivor was reviewed for accuracy by Naval Special Warfare public affairs, and approved.

One of the greatest factual problems with Lone Survivor is the omission of the role the Marines of 2/3 played, and how NAVSOF elements actually fit into the operation. Instead of illustrating that this was a multi-phase Marine Corps operation where NAVSOF was to play roles in the opening phases (mandated as such by CJSOTF-A in order for 2/3 to get low-illumination helicopter support), Robinson ignored Marine Corps involvement altogether, and drafted a narrative that Red Wings (what he mistakenly called Redwing) was a special operation mission targeting one of Osama bin Laden's top lieutenants. He mentions Marines in the area only in passing, stating that they'd been victims of IED (improvised explosive device) strikes.

In Robinson's defense, though, as he never contacted any Marines, he could not have known the full scope of the operation. Naval Special Warfare public affairs, however, should have--as well as many other facts missed in Lone Survivor.

A note on the "vote": In Lone Survivor, and countless articles written about Red Wings, Lieutenant Michael Murphy supposedly put to vote whether to kill unarmed Afghan civilians who soft compromised his team. This ended up being a central pillar to the overall story, and hence, countless blog and online discussoin board posts (and print and online articles) on rules of engagement and morality in warfare. Murphy placing something like this up to vote almost certainly did not happen. I'm so certain that it did not happen that I'm going to just say that it did not happen. After reading this in Lone Survivor, I re-interviewed the Marines who had intimate knowledge of Luttrell's after action. All those I re-interviewed stated that nothing in the AAR said anything about a vote. It infuriated a number of Marines with whom I spoke that the Navy would allow a book to portray A) a member of the U.S. Military even considering the execution of unarmed civilians, B) an officer putting to vote anything, much less something as grave as executing unarmed civilians, or C) an officer straying so far from current rules of engagement. I've scanned an ROE card issued at that time and blocked out most of it, with the exception of the relevant item. This is the ROE card that all troops operating in this area were to carry, printed with rules of engagement to which troops were mandated to adhere, regardless of unit or unit type, during this time. Civilians are not targets! Reads the relevant line.

It is unfathomable to even consider a member of America's military today intentionally killing an unarmed civilian--for any reason. I've spent enough time in Iraq and Afghanistan to see how the American military treats civilians. "The vote" makes for an interesting debate on blogs and for suspenseful writing, but in real life, on real battlefields, especially in a counterinsurgency environment (in which all troops operated in 2005 in Afghanistan), where winning the peoples' trust over destroying an enemy reigns as the number one goal, it just doesn't happen, especially under the leadership of a seasoned officer like Michael Murphy.

I should note that the portrayal of Murphy putting to vote the execution of unarmed civilians not only outraged members of the military, but apparently didn't sit well with his family. Read about it in this this Newsday (Long Island, New York newspaper) article that is no longer available online, but someone cut-and-pasted it here, and here (just the first portion), and it is discussed in this Army Times article by author Sean Naylor. Here is another interesting article by Sean Naylor, an interview with Luttrell, about a number of the topics noted above.

So with all this in mind--from the omission of Marine Corps development of Red Wings, to the inaccuracy of the name of the operation, to the exaggeration of enemy numbers and inflated importance of Ahmad Shah, to "the vote," to other points--why did Naval Special Warfare public affairs personnel approve of what was written in Lone Survivor?

I have no clue. I've tried before to discuss points of Red Wings with NSW public affairs, but they don't respond.

After years of work, VICTORY POINT was released nationally on April 7, 2009, published by the Penguin Group. It received excellent reviews and sold well throughout the country. It was released in paperback on April 6, 2010.

Not much else to say, other than it was based on accuracy and comprehensiveness. To date, other than three typographical errors, nobody has identified a significant error or omission in VICTORY POINT.

Seal of Honor, which focuses on the character of Lieutenant Michael Murphy, the leader of the four man NAVSOF Surveillance and Reconnaissance team utilized for the first phase of Red Wings, was published by the Naval Institute Press on May 5, 2010. The book represents a noble cause by an author Gary Williams, who apparently has never been to Afghanistan (or Iraq), but who spent time with the Murphy family. Because he spent time with the family he seems to have painted an accurate literary portrait of Lieutenant Murphy, the individual. What he did not depict with more than a scintilla of factual resolution was Operation Red Wings itself, including the planning and execution. It was published by the U.S. Naval Institute, and therefore should have been held to a higher level of factual scrutiny than a book released by a more "mainstream" press. The Naval Institute press is a truly great publisher (for the most part). They typically have much higher editorial standards than most publishers, especially on military subjects.

One of the greatest problems with Seal of Honor, like Lone Survivor, is the omission, or in the case of Seal of Honor, the gross distortion, of the role the Marines played in Operation Red Wings. The reality of the SEAL involvement in Red Wings, as stated before, was that 2/3 needed low-illumination helicopter support from the 160th SOAR(A), but the CJSOTF would only task a SOF support element to 2/3 if the plan included a SOF ground element, hence the SEAL involvement in the operation. In Seal of Honor, Williams states that Shah and his men ambushed Marines, and the Marines, who by Williams' account were incapable of undertaking an operation against Shah themselves, went to CJSOTF-A after the ambush and asked to have a special operations unit handle Shah for them. Below is the actual passage, found on page 131 of Seal of Honor:

"On June 3, 2005, Shah's forces ambushed and killed three Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne) near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-E, located outside the town of Orgune in the Paktika province in southwestern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. Killed were Captain Charles D. Robinson and Staff Sergeant Leroy E. Alexander. Seriously burned was Staff Sergeant Christopher N. Piper, who subsequently died of his wounds. The Marines approached CJSOTF-A's commanders and requested the capture or elimination of Shah."

First of all, Paktika Province lies in eastern Afghanistan, not in southwestern Afghanistan. Furthermore, Marines were nowhere to be found in Paktika Province at that time; Paktika was not part of 2/3's AO (area of operation) during their deployment.

But to the issue of real substance here: There is no such unit in the Marine Corps as "Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne)." Captain Charles D. Robinson, Staff Sergeant Leroy E. Alexander, and Staff Sergeant Christopher N. Piper were all members of 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) based out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which fell under the command of CJSOTF-A in Afghanistan. Robinson, Alexander, and Piper were not Marines. The three were special operations personnel, more specifically, Army special operations personnel. The Marines never approached CJSOTF-A with a request for the "capture or elimination" of Ahmad Shah. The Marines went to the SOTF to get low illumination (moonless nighttime) helicopter support because 2/3 did not deploy as a MAGTF with an ACE (Marine Air Ground Task Force with an Air Combat Element), they deployed as an infantry battalion to be integrated into a joint task force (with aviation, artillery, intel, etc. assets from other services). What the Staff of 2/3 got in return to their request was a mandate to integrate a SOF ground unit (SEALs) into the scheme of maneuver for Operation Red Wings if they wanted helicopter support. Read about it in detail in VICTORY POINT.

Williams also grossly distorts the story behind the naming of the operation. While Williams identifies the name Red Wings correctly, he explains that it was coined by a member of the SEALs who "liked to name operations after hockey teams." However, he gives no examples of other operations named for hockey teams by the SEALs prior to Red Wings. The first explanation of how Red Wings got its name in any type of public venue was on the original version of www.darack.com/sawtalosar (archived here) when I put it up in early 2006. I explained the name's origin in some detail in VICTORY POINT, and then in expanded detail on the current version of www.darack.com/sawtalosar including a scan of the list of hockey team names made by 1st Lieutenant Lance Seiffert. There is a clear, documented lineage of how the Marines named their operations, up to and including Operation Red Wings. The Marines of 2/3 named the operation. This is indisputable.

Why so much time spent on the name? The distorted version in Seal of Honor of the SEALs naming the operation tracks in consonance with the narrative originally disseminated by Patrick Robinson's Lone Survivor, that is of Red Wings being an exclusive Special Operations mission. Why would the Marines have naming rights to a mission in which they played no part?

Although a number of other examples of misinformation plague Seal of Honor, I'm going to discuss just one more: the author's portrayal of Operation Whalers. Williams devotes just a few sentences to Whalers, an operation consisting exclusively of conventional forces: Marines of 2/3, attached Afghan National Army troops, and supporting conventional aviation, intelligence, artillery, and other units from U.S. conventional services. Despite an emboldened Shah, who had a force now strengthened due to fighters flowing in to join his ranks because of the notoriety gained with the SEAL ambush and MH-47 shootdown, Operation Whalers was a success, a stark contrast to the disastrous opening phase of Operation Red Wings that defined that mission.

In Seal of Honor, Williams acknowledges that Operation Whalers was carried out by Marines and was successful (Patrick Robinson, by contrast, did not mention Operation Whalers whatsoever in Lone Survivor). However, Williams claims that the SEALs knew of Operation Whalers in early July, 2005, stating that during a speech given by U.S. Navy SEAL Captain Pete Van Hooser on 8 JULY 2005, the Captain had knowledge of the as-yet-to-be planned or executed Operation Whalers (but didn't mention it in his speech). He states that the SEALs knew that it was part of a dual plan (Red Wings and Whalers together) to "rid the Korangal Valley of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces." Williams then states that Operation Whalers was carried out as a response to the ambush and MH-47 shootdown of Red Wings.

Marines of 2/3 exclusively planned and subsequently executed Operation Whalers (with supporting conventional assets of other services). There were no special operations units (including Navy SEALs) involved with Whalers whatsoever--in planning or in execution. (After Red Wings, the battalion did not seek to utilize SOF assets, aviation or otherwise, for the remainder of their deployment). The battalion was still in the throes of the recovery effort of Operation Red Wings II on 8 JULY 2005, and had yet to turn their attention to planning their next operation. A number of operational models were drafted, each possibly to be executed as a named operation (that name turned out to be Whalers, after the Hartford / New England Whalers hockey team). One was by Major Thomas D. Wood, 2/3's operations officer, another was by Captain Matthew Tracy (an assistant operations officer, who arrived in Afghanistan on 4 JULY 2005), yet a third was developed by LtCol James Donnellan (Donnellan arrived with Tracy on 4 JULY 2005. Months prior to 2/3's Afghan deployment, the 3rd Marine regimental command decided to have a pre-planned turnover of battalion commanders, in country), and Major Robert R. Scott (2/3's executive officer). The battalion eventually settled for Wood's plan, with a great deal of input by Donnellan, Rob Scott, and other staff. None of this planning began until late July, weeks after Van Hooser's speech, and none of it involved NAVSOF (SEALs). There was no way Captain Van Hooser could have known about Whalers, until possibly mission execution (middle of August) when the rest of the world learned of it.

Also of note: Williams, in Seal of Honor, states that Whalers was part of a "dual plan," (along with Red Wings), but one paragraph further along, he claims that Whalers was "in response to" the ambush and shootdown. These are mutually exclusive concepts. You can either have one (pre planned) or the other (action, and then reaction based on outcome of action). Not both.

In VICTORY POINT, I describe Red Wings and Whalers collectively as a "campaign," but I do so from a retrospective stance. Each had the same desired "end state" (increased security in the Marines' area of operation), with a significant goal on the horizon: unencumbered National Parliamentary Elections of 18 September, 2005. Because the Marines achieved this (unsuccessful with Red Wings, but then successful with Whalers), the two, in historical context, stood (in my eyes, anyway) as a "campaign." But the Marines certainly did not plan the two together. They were developed in sequence. Furthermore, Whalers was not developed as a response to the ambush and shootdown. The Marines were continuing in their mission to provide security to the citizens of their assigned area of operation. And they did this throughout their entire deployment, like 3/3 who preceded them, and 1/3 who took over the AO in January of 2006 after them: continuous pressure on the enemy simultaneous with continuous outreach to the people of the region (counterinsurgency 101 - read the Small Wars Manual (NAVMC 2890) for more detail).

Download the Small Wars Manual (NAVMC 2890) in full (.pdf) here. After their deployment, 2/3 staff would remark that this resource was one of the most relevant for their deployment, despite it being first published in 1935 (the link is to the 1940 version).

Williams briefly describes the execution of Whalers, claiming that, among other misstatements, the bulk of the fighting took place in the Korangal Valley. While fighting did take place in the Korangal Valley during Whalers, the vast majority of the "contact" occurred in the Chowkay Valley, where the decisive victory over Ahmad Shah (by 3rd Platoon, Fox Company, 2/3 (REIN)) took place. Upon finishing Seal of Honor, I discussed Williams' version of Whalers with one of the Marines of Fox-3, who had also read Seal of Honor. We agreed that we'd heard this version of Whalers before, and quickly realized that Williams' account closely paralleled an account found only on a video game. (The video game was only very, very loosely based on actual events).

Despite these (what I consider inexcusable) misrepresentations, like I noted above, Seal of Honor focuses on Murphy the individual, and should be judged as such. In Williams' defense, he may have just been given this information by his sources, and because he is apparently not familiar with Military operations, not questioned or even considered cross referencing what was given to him.

When I wrote VICTORY POINT, I let the facts speak for themselves. There was a clear, documented historical record (of both publicly available information as well as information gleaned from after action reports and from direct interviews of those involved) of operations developed by 3/3 prior to Red Wings, Red Wings and all that it encompassed, as well as Whalers, which followed Red Wings. I'm shocked that Naval Special Warfare public affairs did not catch the misrepresentations in Lone Survivor and I'm stunned even more so that the editorial staff at the Naval Institute Press didn't catch the problems in Seal of Honor.

The "narrative" of a four-man SEAL team being inserted and taking on an army of dozens or hundreds under the leadership of the top lieutenant of the most wanted individual in modern history makes for a great story line, but the reality of Operation Red Wings is far more complex, far less "hollywood," and involves many more entities than is portrayed in either Lone Survivor or Seal of Honor. Those involved in providing information, those involved in fact checking, and those who act as surrogates for any particular military unit or type of unit (either directly or de facto) should realize that in the long run, a convenient, custom-whittled "narrative" will never stand as a replacement for the (often more complex, but typically less glory filled) truth. I reference the discussions I've had with Marine commanders I noted above about the importance of telling the full story--good, bad, somewhere in between, boring, or even embarrassing. Ultimately, crafting and disseminating a "narrative" chock full of distortion, omission, and exaggeration works disparagingly to all involved.

The truth always rises far above, outshines, and outlasts all else.

--Ed Darack, Fort Collins, Colorado. August, 2010

Questions? Feel free to send me an email: ed@darack.com